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Foreword

This paper marks for me the culmination of ruminations that began with the study of
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, studies of Emile Durkheim’s anomie, Martin Heidegger’s Being
and Time, and ended with the emergence of a worldview that encompasses the current
predicament faced by the postmodern individual. By investigating the construction of identity,
and the rampant devaluation of traditional values in our current society, I thought there must be a
common source; it has been the search for this source that has led me to this thesis over the last
four years, perhaps, going back even farther. My time as student pursuing a philosophy degree
exposed me to the works of philosophers that have given me the proper nomenclature and
lexicon to be able to formulate this process of devaluation I see every day in society. As well,
though, as I believe that individuals in the United States possess varying degrees of nihilism, I
have faith that the individual will subscribe to valuations that empower, not hinder.
For to be honest, if one is to understand the power structure in the West as representing
the vast multitude of subjects at the bottom, overseen by the very few at the top, and if power
and its attendant, authority, do not come simply from the possession of money, then power must
come in the form of either truth, freedom, authenticity and/or subscribing to traditional
valuations already possessing the positive power of not only participation in them, but also,
intrinsically, the historical legitimacy of culture and custom. This fact may not be entirely
elucidated by the following work; instead, the impression may be that subjectively subscribed
valuation is a source of “surrogate” power, or “the power of the powerless” as it exists for the
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disenfranchised denizen at the bottom of the socio-economic power structure, a proposition I am
hesitant to fully make. At least, though, through the aesthetic active participation of producing
art, or the project of artful living, perhaps the individual may again approach truth, freedom, and
authenticity.
Lastly, this work does not fully explore all the various angles and prescriptions for
overcoming the disenfranchisement of universal commodification. Much of the work I did
exploring this topic took me in the direction Nicholas Gane took in his work Max Weber and
Postmodern Theory, whereby he used the sociological work of Max Weber and worked it out
through three French postmodernists: Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Foucoult. This current paper
deviates from this approach, exploring the source of the nihilism through the phenomenological
position of the German dialecticians. Though, in the future, I wish to explore the notions of
Baudrillard’s erotic sphere, and more specifically, how sex may correlate to aesthetic objects as
perhaps objects that contain not only mystery, but also, perhaps negatively, the potential for
danger and death; the dialectic relationship between Eros and Thanatos that may or may not
correlate to creation or annihilation that exist together within mystery objects.

Franklin Fehrman
New Orleans, 2017
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Abstract
The last half of the twentieth century into the twenty-first century, in the West, has been
referred to as postmodern. Postmodernity represents a stage in a society after having passed
through a nihilism, itself produced by the universal commodification inherent in late stage
capitalism. Here we explore the progress of devaluation through Adorno’s negative dialects to
ascertain the potential for truth and authenticity in the object. Informing Adorno’s negative
dialectics, were Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Through their dialectics, Adorno postulated the effect of
commodities, as objects, within the first part of the 20th century, and how the lack of potential for
truth and freedom in these objects anticipated the nihilism of both the late capitalism period, into
the postmodern period. This nihilism itself, was anticipated by Nietzsche. Further, this entire
focus on and influence of commodities on the individual, from the early twentieth century to the
present is referred to as the commodity structure and itself can be equated to Heidegger’s falling
prey. Once the subject has had the valuation or meaning of their lives stripped via this universal
commodification of the commodity structure, this paper will argue through the works of
Heidegger and Nietzsche and the role of the aesthetic, only then can the subject in the
postmodern period reclaim qua participation in one’s own becoming towards both truth and
authenticity, as well as freedom.

Keywords: aesthetic, commodification, nihilism, negative dialectics, authenticity.
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Introduction
In the last century, a shift to late stage capitalism has left the individual subject in a state
of disillusionment and decline, due to an inherent nihilism via universal commodification.
Contrary to the work of the eighteenth century German Idealists, such as Kant, Hegel and Marx,
postmodern thinkers recognized that “the Enlightenment ‘project’ of liberating humanity from
servitude and superstition had not only failed in its aims but had actually produced more
powerful myths and even more absolute forms of domination” (Bennett 3). Specific to the work
of Kant and Hegel is the relation between the subject and the object, what was referred to as a
dialectical relation. The negative determination of Hegel, became the positive ascension of the
individual, as Absolute Spirit, to the higher forms of culture and civilization. Later, it was Marx
who had coined the ‘material dialectic’, placed across history that posited a final conflict that
would end in Utopia, usurping the disenchanting capitalism blooming in the nineteenth century.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, though, the nature of capitalism began to take
on a different role: “late capitalism should be seen less as a continuation of classical or monopoly
capitalism than as a ‘different ‘order’ of commodification,’ and that this last order is itself only
one among several processes of de-differentiation at work in postmodernity as a whole”
(Miklitsch 80). This late capitalism became more and more revolved around the commodity,
which took on the quality of structures; technological characteristics of mass production. For if
the commodity itself could be referred to as an artificial object, as such, then the dialectic
relation between subject and object would therefore change as well. This dialectic itself, as
observed by Adorno, took the form of a negative dialectic; or a regression, or tension between
the subject and the object. But the form itself is “anti-systematic” (Adorno 122); instead it should
be seen as more of a method of critically analyzing the objects we encounter, for the potential of
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truth and authenticity. This act itself is a form of intellectual freedom (Ibid. 84, 89). The subject,
using negative dialects, is able to ascertain that truth, freedom, and authenticity, do not exist in
the commodity objects of the commodity structure, and must then create art objects to provide
these qualities or must overcome their own falling prey-ness as the “objectified” subject and
become authentic Beings.
The state of universal commodification “assimilates personal attributes, relations and
desired states of affairs to the realm of objects by assuming that all human attributes are
possessions bearing a value characterizable in money terms, and by implying that all these
possessions can and should be separable from persons to be exchanged through the free market”
(Radin 6), I would argue, bears a striking similarity to Heidegger’s mode of being, falling prey.
Further, universal commodification is, in essence, the same thing as reification which “refers to
the moment that a process or relation is generalized into an abstraction . . . [and] refers to the
generation of a ‘phantom objectivity’, meaning that a human creation—an institution or an
ideology, say—takes on the character of a ‘force that controls human beings’” (Bewes 3-4). We
will associate this process of reification, and its consequences with the term commodity
structure.
Once universal commodification alienates the relation between subject and object by
changing the qualities of the objects encountered in the world of artifice, the subject is left
unmoored from the potentialities of both truth and authenticity, as well as of freedom. The world
of artifice is simply the world of man-made manufactured existence, not the natural world. This
unmooring, existent in the falling prey of the commodity structure, turns into nihilism, as defined
by Nietzsche in his Will To Power. This nihilism ultimately then becomes a choice for the
subject in the commodity structure; does one be the last man, or the Ubermensch? For if the
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object, given as commodity lacks the potentiality for truth and authenticity, via the prior concept
of dialects, then one should seek or create objects that possess truth and authenticity,
characteristics I would argue, are found in aesthetic objects. Further, participation in this
choosing and creating of objects of truth and authenticity, I would argue, also resemble the same
type of freedom intimated in Nietzsche’s notion of becoming. Participation in authenticity also
invokes Heidegger, who we will also explore. Needless to say, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and
Adorno all share the common stance, namely, that from the despair or angst that comes from
living in a state of nihilism and inauthenticity arises the ground or starting point for authenticity
as well as becoming.
In Part One, we will introduce the method of negative dialectics. To do this we will
approach Adorno biographically, that is, how did he come to form the negative dialectics? We
will start with the influence he received from his childhood tutor on Kant. We will see, then, how
Hegel’s Absolute Idealism and its “triadic” dialectic (Adorno 6) gave Adorno the framework to
his negative dialectics. We will then explore how through its employment, the faults unmasked
in both Kant and Hegel systems, helped him to develop his theory. We will then ask, “what is
negative dialectics?”, and further why is it an appropriate tool for our current critique?
In Part Two, we will explore the implications of commodification. We will start by
examining Marx’s commodity fetishism and how this aspect of earlier capitalism turned into the
commodity structure of the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. As well, we will
explore four aspects of objects, Heidegger’s “innerworldly things at hand” (Heidegger 1996:
103), or objects at hand; commodities, which we will define via Marx; technology, being a
quality of late capitalistic commodities, and its implications on subject/object relations; and
lastly, art objects. An important distinction must here be made that the objects we are concerned
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with exist in the Greek term nous, or of human origin and not per se the physis, or natural world
though obviously, nature provides all the materia for artificial objects. After delineating these
four types of objects, we will describe their interrelation. After this, we will must define how the
concepts of “truth” and “freedom” may be found in the object via the subject.
In Part Three, we will examine the correlation between the commodity structure and
Heidegger’s falling prey and Nietzsche’s nihilism. As well, we will try to show how this nihilism
characterized by the commodity structure nature of falling prey is produced by universal
commodification. We will go into some detail of Heidegger’s falling prey in order to show how
it ties into inauthenticity. This inauthenticity, I argue, is the predominant quality of participation
in the commodity structure. As well, by showing the inauthenticity of the commodity structure, I
intend in the following section to illustrate how authenticity may be achieved. By extrapolating
on Nietzsche’s nihilism, we anticipate the ways in which through the active participation of
becoming, the subject, already intimately doomed through the interrelation with the commodified
object, may resurrect themselves.
In Part Four, we begin by readdressing the contemporary state of post-modernism and its
implications. Then I will give my definition of art object, and explain how it satisfies a role of
authenticity via Heidegger, as well as of truth. Approaching the art object via Nietzsche, we find
similarities between the unintentional viewing of the object, and the intoxication necessary for
the creation of the art object. This unintentionality is contra Husserl’s definition of
intentionality, which we will explore in the first section. Further, after passing through nihilism,
into the post-modern, the subject as object is faced with two choices, the first to continue to fall
prey, and the second choice may well be referred to as the art of living. This art of living, is the
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subject participating in itself as the art object, which represents the freedom of the subject in the
postmodern period, parallel to Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch.
Methodology and Assumptions
The approach taken throughout this work is postmodernist in its basic thrust, and much of
the terminology reflects this. As well, many of the terms come from the phenomenological and
German idealist tradition. Therefore, the following terms are here defined for the reader to obtain
some clarity:
Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics is the approach to objects encountered whereby the positive
appearance negatively reveals what it does not show. An example comes from Maurice MerleauPonty whereby the angle one view a glass, negatively provides that there is the side one does not
see.
“Constellation of Construction”: This term comes from the work of Walter Benjamin and means
that objects hold within them ideas and or facts about the reality that constructed them.
Intentionality: This term comes from Edmund Husserl and regards the conscious and purposeful
viewing of an object or one of its facets so as to allow it to be more well understood.
Sublimation: Sublimation is the conscious act of categorizing an object rationally thus
consciously bounding the object, and at the same time, actively intertwining oneself with the
reality of the object.
Factic/Factically: This is a Heideggerian phrase simply implying the reality of the subject and the
world one inhabits.
They-self: A Heideggerian term meaning other subjects existent in our lives who inform and
consensually manufacture the given world to us.
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Falling Prey: A Heideggerian term meaning the act of participating in the consensually
manufactured, inauthentic world of the They-self.
Angst: A Heideggerian term that is equitable to a moment of uncertainty experienced by the
individual if and when they begin to question the authenticity of the given world of the Theyself.
Negative Dialectics: A dialectical exercise utilized by the individual to repurpose the more
traditional dialectic relationship between the subject and the object whereby the truth and
progress is not given by a triadic thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectic. The third term,
representing an apex to the first two, the synthesis is denied and the dialectic relationship
between the subject and object is analyzed by the thinking subject whereby either the object
reveals hermeneutically that which it is not displaying, or the consciousness sees the subject and
object relationship and then seeks hermeneutically truth, freedom, and authenticity in the
negative space between the two. As well, the dialectical relationship itself can be stepped back
from and seen in a detached manner whereby the dialectic relationship itself negatively reveals
positivistic truth, freedom and authenticity.
Reification: Similar to sublimation and the “constellation of construction”, whereby the object
represents concretized thought and/or social and cultural reality.
Da-sein: The individual or subject.
Being-in/of-the-world: The reality consensually constructed by others implying a participatory
role.
Phenomenology: The practice systemizing existence via the empirically observed phenomena
thus experienced by the subject.
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Encompassed: Similar to sublimation, this term means to consciously encompass an object or
event.
Aesthetics: The field of thought in pursuit of art and its relationship to bigger ideas such as
beauty and truth.
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Part One: Negative Dialectics
In order to understand the negative dialectics of Adorno, it is important to understand the
general positive positions of the main dialecticians that informed him; Kant and Hegel. We will
also need to explain the purpose for utilizing Adorno’s negative dialectics at all, specifically how
it uses hermeneutics, mimetics and thus, how it may provide the truth and freedom of the object.
In the first place, we must begin by understanding Kant’s influence on Adorno. “In 19181919, while Germany was reeling from military defeat and political upheaval, the fifteen-yearold Adorno studied music and spent his weekend hours reading Kant” (Buck-Morss 2). This
influence on Adorno, had the original effect of instilling in him the Kantian notion that “we
cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think
them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there
can be appearance without anything that appears” (Kant 27). This also ties into Kant’s famous
Copernican Revolution, whereby Adorno “reversed the polarity of the relation between subject
and object, [and] gave, as he later worded it [the] ‘Copernican Revolution an axial turn,’ so that
nonidentity became the very basis of knowledge” (Buck Morss 83). The Copernican Revolution
of Kant was famous for turning the philosopher’s attention away from the object’s influence on
the subject and analyzing the conceptual categorization and mutual interdependence of the
thinking subject with the object. As well, Adorno’s earlier Kantian teachings also provided him
with the necessary conflict between subject and object:
If later, in regard to the traditional philosophical texts, I not so
much let myself be impressed by their unity and systematic
coherence as I concerned myself with the play of opposing and
conflicting forces which [go] on under the surface of every self-

9

contained theoretical position, and which codified philosophy
sometimes accounts for as force-field, then it was certainly
Kracauer [ed. his tutor] who gave me the idea. He made the
Critique of Pure Reason present to me not simply as a system of
transcendental idealism. Much more, he showed me . . . how the
most eloquent parts of the work are the wounds which the conflict
in the theory leaves behind. (Buck-Morss 80)
To be sure, the breaks he found in the works of Kant were between the phenomena and the
noumena; the concept and the reality. Yet, later, in his use of the “monadical abbreviations” or
“constellations of constructions” (ibid. 112, 176) deciphered through the mimetic,
hermeneutical nature of the negative dialectic, which we will address later, Adorno was able to
solve the “riddle of the idealists” from the standpoint of treating the subject and object, together
as “inextricably bound” (ibid. 112) elements thereby reflecting the two under the reified
relationship of the commodity structure; negating the dialectal question altogether in the favor
of seeking the antinomies residing in whatever system he applied this negative gaze at, as well
as finding the negative relationship between the dialectic itself and consciousness in a negative
space.
We will now address the influence of Hegel on Adorno’s thinking. For starters, Hegel’s
logic consists of a triadic relationship between the subject and the object, instigating a third
phase, that represents the synthesis, thereby informing the next progressed level’s thesis or
subjective position. In a sense, the relation between the two facilitates the revealing of the
subject to itself through encountering the object. Further, Hegel’s logic is mapped across
history, whereby the pinnacle of the dialectic represents a return of Spirit to itself represented in
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nineteenth century German civilization. The level’s rise from the subject through the object,
lays the foundation to higher levels of relations, up through familial relations, to the instance of
society and civilization up to higher forms of human achievement in the forms of culture,
philosophy, and religion.
Specifically, important to Hegel’s dialectic is the negative nature of the subject, or the
determinant nature of the subject:
. . . this idea is that the subject, which as thinking subject criticizes
given institutions, represents the first instance the emancipation of
the spirit. And, as the emancipation of the spirit, it represents the
decisive transition from its mere being-in-itself to a being-foritself. In other words, the stage that has been reached here is one in
which spirit confronts objective realities, social realities . . . this
subjectivity is a mere aspect that has turned self into an absolute; it
overlooks the fact that it owes its own substance, its forms, its very
existence to the objective forms and existence of society; and that
it actually becomes conscious of itself by conceiving of the
seemingly alien and even repressive institutions as being like itself,
by comprehending them as subjective and perceiving them in their
necessity. (Adorno 14)
Adorno is trying to depart from the Idealist aspect of Hegel’s system. Specifically, the function
by which Hegel uses determinant negation of the subject to create a positive, affirming system.
Further, he repurposes this negation found in Hegel from the relation between subject and object,
and as mentioned in the above section on Kant, after denying the original dialectical question of
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subject/object, he then uses this negative approach of the philosopher to negatively reveal the
truth, freedom and thence authenticity in the negative space between the subject and object. That
is, the original dialectic between subject and object was part of the process, as Hegel had termed
it, of a determinant negation in a positive fashion. Adorno saw the negative aspect itself as the
process whereby truth and freedom would be revealed to a thinking subject: “The negativity I am
speaking about contains a pointer to what Hegel calls determinate negation. In other words,
negativity of this kind is made concrete and goes beyond mere standpoint philosophy by
confronting concepts with their objects, and, conversely, objects with their concepts. Negativity
in itself, if such a concept were not nonsensical—since by virtue of its being in itself, a concept
that exists essentially only in context, i.e. for others, turns into its own opposite” (Adorno 25).
Before discussing the negative dialectics as a tool for subject approaching the object, and
the similarities between hermeneutics and the relation to mimetics, we must explain that for
Adorno history had proven itself as not positive, and that the Enlightenment promise of reason
being the salvation for humanity had obviously failed, evidenced by the use and shadow of the
atomic bomb, and the instance of the Holocaust in the West. Therefore, if truth and freedom
were no longer found in the dialectical systems of Hegel and Marx, then what was the access
point for the subject to attain truth and notions of freedom. We are not including authenticity
here, because we will need to address in the following section how the commodity structure
relates to the notion of falling prey, and how the objects found in late capitalistic countries are
such that through their inauthenticity, they breed nihilism. This will allow for a more thorough
conversation on authenticity.
As I mentioned, the negative dialectics utilizes hermeneutics and mimetics. Hermeneutics
is utilized extensively in existential philosophers such as Sartre, as well as phenomenological
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thinkers such as Heidegger and Paul Ricouer. Hermeneutics is the idea that “every understanding
lights up its objects only against a background that cannot at the same time be brought into the
light” (Melchert G-3). Put another way, it may be said that the interpretation of the object itself
reveals unnoticed truths, tacitly contained in the factic nature of the subject, revealed by the
object. This also relates to mimetics, whereby “visibly ‘given’ objects were translated into terms
of nonvisible social process” whereby the elements revealed concepts not in a synthetic sense,
but that the phenomena “illuminated contradictions” (Buck-Morss 102).
Another important aspect of the negative dialectics, which we will bring back up later is
the way that art and aesthetics are an important remedy to postmodern nihilism, through the
notion of unintentionality. In fact, this unintentionality informs the basis of truth found in
objects. If we can understand that for Husserl, intentionality was a requisite for the bracketing off
of objects for phenomenological hermeneutics, for Adorno, the unintentionality found in the
negative space between the subject and object revealed the mimetic nature of both the subject
and the object. Here, Adorno’s great friend Walter Benjamin explains:
Truth never enters into a relation, and particularly not an
intentional one. The object of knowledge as something determined
within conceptual intention is not truth. Truth, built out of ideas
[rather than appearing within them], is unintentional being. The
procedure which adequately conforms to it is therefore not an
intending within the knowing process, but entering into [truth] and
disappearing. Truth is the death of intention. (Buck-Morss 77)
Put another way, for Adorno the potentiality for truth was not given by the object, but requires
the thinking subject to interpret, albeit and mystically, unintentionally.
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The ability of the subject to interpret represents a form of autonomy and freedom we
made mention of earlier when we posited that the negative relation provides truth and freedom.
For the subject exists in a social world consentually constructed, a constitution of our being. But
this constitution is given to us by the commodity structure. Put another way, the givenness of
Heidegger’s They-self in a state of falling prey. By approaching the object unintentionally, we
secure knowledge and truth, and the speculative subject attains a greater understanding both of
the illusory nature of the givenness of the world, and negatively, the conscious overcoming of
this state of being. This differentiation between “socially necessary illusion” (Adorno 100) and
the active form of enquiry, or resistance, as Adorno refers to the practice of philosophy,
“transcends the objects while remaining closely in touch with them” (ibid 107). And where our
thoughts, confronted by objects, reach a depth that leaves some thoughts uncategorized and new,
“[t]his speculative surplus that goes beyond whatever is the case, beyond mere existence, is the
element of freedom in thought, and because it is, because it alone does stand for freedom,
because it represents the tiny quantum of freedom we possess, it also represents the happiness of
thought” (ibid. 108)
The purpose of this section has been to demonstrate what the negative dialectic is in a
very brief fashion. What has been important, has been to illustrate that the dialectic itself
represents a novel turn from the subject/object relation inherent in the works of Hegel as well as
the way in which it may be used to attain truth and freedom from the object, in general. Just as
important is that this dialectical illustration represents an active confrontation of the subjects
consciousness with the negative space existent between subject and object, and thus
consciousness with the dialectic in general. This negative aspect will be important later in the
section on aesthetics, by way of both Heidegger and Nietzsche. Further, the negative relation to
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the dialectics of the subject/object, frees the subject from the inauthentic aspect of the object as
commodity encountered to a greater extent in the world. In the next section, we are going to
explore commodity structure that has developed at the turn of the nineteenth century, and
continued up until the present.

15

Part Two: The Object as Commodity
The purpose of this section deviates from the discussion of negative dialectics in order to
explain the types of objects encountered in late capitalistic countries. The other purpose is to
provide the ground by which we may illustrate and prove the nihilism that follows from
universal commodification which makes up the commodity structure, or, the factic matrix of late
capitalistic countries. Lastly, we need to illustrate how this crucial quality of the commodity
structure breeds nihilism so that we may come to a post-nihilistic order in the guise of postmodernity and the salvation of the subject in the last part.
It is important here to delineate the nuanced differences between what we mean by
objects encountered in the world. This list is not all encompassing, nor does it pretend to be
exhaustive; it is an attempt to categorize objects given at once in the world and the potential
quality thus found for truth and freedom for the subject. This important and will lead us to the
final section, on the aesthetic potential for freedom and authenticity. For now, we will describe
the types of objects most commonly encountered, and then how reification informs the
commodity structure and how this commodity structure objectifies the subject. As well, we must
reiterate that these are objects of artifice, not of nature.
The first type of object is a category for objects that I am borrowing from Heidegger’s
concept of “things” such that they exist neutrally as objects that populate our existence. I will refer
to them as objects at hand, and they imply a degree of utility. This borrowing from Heidegger does
not intend on including his notion of a totality of worldly things (Heidegger 1996: 62-71), and is
not meant for our purposes to indicate those objects that Heidegger used in his phenomenological
enterprise Being and Time as an initial interfacing of Dasein factically with the being-of-the-world.
Though, similarly to our position, one might argue that once we have explained the relationship
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between reification and the commodity structure, and the commodity structure to falling prey one
might be tempted to make greater comparisons. For now, I will say that these objects at hand have
the non-spectacular quality of being consciously encompassed (Jaspers 227-228). What this means
is that consciously the subject has already overcome or delimited the potentiality for the object to
transcend its own parameters of being; that is, the subject overcomes the object consciously and
anticipates its horizons, not to be exceeded. Further, these objects at hand tend to always have the
quality of fungibility, a characteristic of commodities (Radin 118). Fungibility is the property of
goods to be mutually transferable, one to the other mostly through the medium of capital. Lastly,
there exists an initial novelty for the being of these objects at hand when they start as a commodity,
which gradually digresses into a habitual taken-for-grantedness.
The second type of object is the commodity. We find in Marx’s Capital: “The commodity
is, first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of
whatever kind. The nature of these needs whether they arise from the stomach or the imagination,
makes no difference” (Marx 125). For our purposes, we should think of the commodity as an object
instantly encompassed. That is, when the subject sees the commodified object the subject itself has
already arrested the potentiality for the object as commodity to be overcome. Margaret Radin uses
“four indicia of commodification in conceptualization”: 1) objectification, 2) fungibility, 3)
commensurability and 4) money equivalence (Radin 118). Commodity represents an object that
will greatly inform our further discussion on the commodity structure and its implications. Lastly,
commodified objects, or objects with a monetary value, make up nearly every artificial
environment that Western subject finds themselves in.
Thirdly, is the object of technology, itself a commodity with the quality of enrapturing the
subject by way of guile and glamour. Put another way, technology, as object, is instantly
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encompassed as an object, and thus, can pass into the taken-for-grantedness of an object at hand
in the sense of hammer or a calculator. It also has the potentiality to remain novel in that objects
of technology act as platforms for an endless stream of content or novel media. Technology has
the potential of suspending the subject within the commodity structure, arresting his or her
transcendence by disallowing the interpretative action of seeing the relation between subject/object
within the negative space of unintentionality. Further, as the subject becomes more enamored with
more consciously immersive forms of technology, the subject sinks further into its own reified
existence, thus denying the inherent freedom I referred to earlier, potentialized in the object, as
such. Adorno refers to this tendency of technology as a form of fascism in his Minima Moralia:
“Technology is making gestures precise and brutal and with them men . . . The movements
machines demand of their users already [has the] violent, hard-hitting, unresting jerkiness of
Fascist maltreatment. Not the least to blame for the withering of experience is the fact that things,
under the law of pure functionality, assume a form that limits contact with them to mere operation
and tolerates no surplus, either in freedom [emphasis mine] of conduct or in [the] autonomy of
things, which would survive as the core of experience, because it is not consumed by the moment
of action” (Buck-Morss 181).
The last object, I posit, is the art object. The art object is what I will be exploring in the
last section of this work and I will define its parameters then. For now, I will say that the art object
has the quality of immediately not being overcome. As well, in the fact that it cannot be
encompassed, it also stands as an object that allows for the necessary observation of the negative
space before intimated. We will see later, how this negative space relates to Nietzsche’s
intoxication. Further, as the subject itself increasingly becomes objectified and therefore
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commodified, the redemptory path of the subject in post-modern times becomes an active form of
nihilism and then to becoming; the subject takes on the quality of an art object.
The relation between the objects is such that: a) all commodities are artificial and represent
an objectification, as such; b) all objects of technology are commodities; c) no art objects are either
objects at hand, nor commodities; d) objects at hand are almost always commodities, though, if
they start as art objects (such as, for example, an “artisanal hammer”, or a handmade pen), they
eventually lose their quality of not being encompassed and fall into taken-for-grantedness; e) art
objects, in the very fact that they cannot be commodities and thus do not participate in the
commodity structure, possess authenticity, and this authenticity, as a quality, can never be
diminished; and lastly f) objects at hand do not necessarily possess, by way of their utility, the
quality of inauthenticity per se, but if they formerly existed as commodities and not as artisanal
objects at hand, they can never possess the quality of authenticity.
One of the most important turns for this argument comes from understanding how the
reification of objects into commodities comes to create the commodity structure. The answer
comes from Georg Lukacs:
The commodity can only be understood in its undistorted essence
when it becomes the universal category of society as a whole. Only
in this context does the reification produced by commodity
relations [emphasis mine] assume decisive importance both for the
objective evolution of society and for the stance adopted by men
towards it. Only then does the commodity become crucial for the
subjugation of men’s consciousness to the forms in which this
reification finds expression and for their attempts to comprehend the
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process or to rebel against its disastrous effects and liberate
themselves from servitude to the ‘second nature’ so created. (Lukacs
86)
The ‘second nature’ Lukacs refers to is the permeating acceptance and reinforcement of the status
quo and participatory reinforcement of “universal commodification” (Radin 2-6), or the
commodification of everything.
We need to understand two important implications: 1) capitalism has created within
countries that practice it a commodity structure through reification. This is a factic reality simply
by observing the ubiquitous nature of commodities, objects of technology, and objects at hand in
our everyday lives. Further, these three categories of objects all lack the immediate quality of an
intoxicating negative space. That is, by the very nature of our subjective entanglement with them
in our own constitution of falling prey, they represent objects that do not possess the potential as
objects for the subject to acquire truth or freedom as defined above. Therefore, existence in the
commodity structure for those in the First World countries is defined by a lack of truth, freedom
as well as authenticity.
The second implication develops from the first, namely that as this time period we are
living in is referred to as late capitalism. In this era, we could say the universal commodification
has reached its pinnacle. In a negative sense, the commodification of objects, events and traditional
forms of valuation has actually devalued their actual worth. Therefore, lacking the proper access
to value, as well as truth, freedom and authenticity, the subject is left to manufacture meaning,
pastiche-ing together identity and meaning from commodities. This further reiterates the negative
position of Adorno, that there has not been an ascent, historically, but indeed, a descent. For, in
contrast to the positive dialectics of both Marx and Hegel, peoples in capitalistic countries,
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specifically First World countries in the late capital stage, have become moored in the falling preyness of the commodity structure and have had their former achievements, accurately described by
Hegel as culture, religion, the family, philosophy, and art devalued, replaced, and/or commodified.
Up until now, we have used the term late capitalism without giving a proper definition. But
having now explained the relation between reification, commodification and how both inform and
have produced the commodity structure, we can now lay out what late capitalism is. The
commodity structure of late capitalism “should be seen less as a continuation of classical or
monopoly capitalism than as a’ different ‘order’ of commodification,’ and that this last order is
itself only one among several processes of differentiation at work in postmodernity as a whole”
(Miklitsch 80). We will explore postmodernity more in the last part on the aesthetic redemption.
This leads us to our next part: nihilism. The position I take is that nihilism is the inevitable
consequence of the negative valuation via commodification. Further, the subject, entangled with
the object of commodity, begins to apply commodity valuation to himself, thus devaluing him or
herself. The nihilism comes from the lack of truth, freedom and authenticity the subject seeks, and
yet does not find in the majority of objects found in the commodity structure of a late capitalistic
existence. As well this nihilism acts in tandem with the falling prey aspect of the factic reality of
existence in those places. So, we will explore Heidegger’s falling prey, as well as Nietzsche’s
nihilism. The goal is such that by exposing that we exist to a greater and greater extent in a nihilistic
existence, we may only then, by accepting our reality, work at creating meaning and valuation in
our lives aesthetically.
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Part Three: Commodity Structure Falling Prey-ness and Nihilism
In this section, we will begin by showing the similarities between Heidegger’s conception
of falling prey and the commodity structure. This concept of falling prey also informs the idea of
inauthenticity. Further, we will show the similarities between the devaluation of values inherent in
universal commodification and Nietzsche’s nihilism. These two philosophers will also inform the
redemptive nature of the aesthetic in final section, and therefore are even more pertinent to our
discussion. Lastly, it is important to understand that nihilism marks a transitory phase in the
progress of capitalism to late capitalism and thence to post-modernity, and occurs sometime
between classical capitalism and late capitalism. Once nihilism has set in, this informs postmodernity, but not after.
In the first place, we are going to explore how Heidegger’s falling prey, as a structural
development of Da-sein’s being as care, works in tandem with the commodity structure. Falling
prey also perpetuates reification and both inform the nature of the commodity structure of late
capitalism and “take on the character of ‘a force that controls human beings’” (Bewes 3-4).
Reification is the process by which the commodity structure supports conformity with its given
valuations. Contrast the definition of reification just given to that of falling prey. Falling prey is a
constitution of being-in-the-world, a form of participation, that is defined also as entanglement
(Heidegger 1996: 164) Through the idle talk with others (the “They”, or other people existing in
and amongst us in our “fallen” state of inauthentic existence), pure curiosity bereft of
understanding, and the ambiguity by which authentic objects, such as the event of dying are
informed by others. The principle characteristic of falling prey, as it pertains to our current work,
is the givenness of the world via universal commodification.
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Another important consideration of falling prey is that it is not limited to late capitalist
countries. The “They” that informs the subject (Dasein) is contingent on the factic reality of the
specific time and culture of the specific country one is in. Let me put it another way. As a
constitution of the being of the subject, falling prey relates to the way the subject takes for granted
notions, or in our case, objects in the form of commodities, in such a way that the very makeup of
the individual becomes synonymous with the World as informed by the They-self. The example
Heidegger gives is that we build within ourselves the notion of death given by the They-self. But
the problem occurs because the individual understands that the if he or she does not understand
death as a potentiality that has not yet occurred, then neither has anyone else and thereby contains
within it the seeds of its own undermining. To understand how this translates to our treatment, we
need to consider the next important quality of Heidegger’s falling prey.
Heidegger also relates the falling prey of the They-self with the quality of informed
perceptions given, as being inherently inauthentic. That is, the individual who lives according to
the consensual givenness of the They-self is in effect living inauthentically, because he or she is
ultimately accepting what is given from others without pursuing truth or freedom, qualities that
would possessed in one who was creating their own authentic existence through active
participation. This is an important point, and again, one that anticipates Nietzsche’s redemptive
participation of aesthetic becoming. Further, we understand that falling prey, as a mode of
existence is a preliminary to angst (Heidegger 1992: 156-204). Angst, in the same way as Adorno’s
hermeneutics and mimetics, or his physiognomy, allows for the unconcealing of truth in the object.
For angst seems to represent a negative moment of revealing of the inauthentic nature of given
objects of the They-self. Adorno uses no such method to alleviate the angst of the individual faced
with the inauthenticity of the “object” thus given; for him, the physiognomy allowed the thinking
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subject to behold the object such to reveal “constellations of constructions” (Buck-Morss 176)
embedded in the object. The important point here, though, is that the givenness of the They-self
nearly completely parallels the inauthenticity of the “objects” given by the commodity structure.
Heidegger’s schema is important to understand the character of the commodity culture of
late capital countries and how it behaves. As well, Heidegger’s notion of falling prey is not itself
a malevolent force; a part of its dynamic is its function as everydayness towards the world
whichever world that may be for the subject. For our purposes, the world we are describing is late
capitalism via commodity structure and reification, which themselves have negative effects on the
subject. The way that the subject is informed in a state of falling prey, as commodity structure,
bleeds into the individual making them vulnerable as the subject then starts to associate themselves
with the object: “objectification comes about through commodification when our cultural rhetoric
conceives of certain attributes of the person [in much the same way] as commodities that can be
bought and sold” (Radin 156). Thus, “objectification can be internalized; as, for example, when
women conceive of themselves some aspects as sex objects for men’s use. Personhood is
compromised from within as well as from without” (ibid. 157). Here, we may interchangeably take
the word “personhood” and interchangeably use it with the word “identity”. The implications of
this will become clear for us in Nietzsche’s becoming. The last point here is that the process of
subjective objectification becoming commodification is a subjective process and saturates
individuals to varying degrees.
The last point I will make about Heidegger’s falling prey constitution and how it informs
the quality of givenness of the current commodity structure is how it informs inauthenticity, and
thereby negatively unconceals authenticity. In other words, if it wasn’t for the very nature of
inauthenticity, and thereby the general relationship of the informing “They” and the subject, we
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wouldn’t be able to recognize that the nature of what is given, in this case objects of commodity,
are inherently without authenticity. Further, by recognizing that the nature of commodification
thus undermines the valuation of values through objectification, we may understand that the
subject themselves participate in the process of becoming inauthentic. As we will see in the next
section on aesthetics, the work itself is for the subject to create or produce either art objects, or as
an already fallen objectified subject, the subject needs to participate in their own self-becoming.
Nietzsche speaks of nihilism in two distinct ways that we may use to inform our current
study. The first occurs, explicitly, in his Will to Power. The second example, in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, needs a little translation. In the former, as an explicit call to action, we understand
how Nietzsche’s nihilistic bent of philosophy has much in common with Adorno, Heidegger, and
the other existentialists: that the subject must indeed lose or have annihilated that which held value
prior such that this ground level becomes the “worthless[ness] of the ground of creation” (Rosen
199) whereby the subject must either “actively or reactively” (Rampley 218) choose his own way
towards freedom and becoming.
Again, to reiterate my claim, this process itself, of pursuing a renewed relation between
subject and object that has the negative space potential in the dialectical schema reclaiming truth,
freedom and authenticity, represents a phase that comes after the capitalistic quality of universal
commodification. This was the situation in Europe and the United States from the late eighteenth
century, accelerating exponentially through the twentieth century until today, evolving into a postnihilistic phase that is aptly referred to as post-modernity.
As Nietzsche himself was writing in the late eighteen hundreds, he was cognizant of this
potential trend, and in The Will to Power, we find the most explicit expressions of it. Firstly,
Nietzsche recognizes that “European culture has been moving as toward a catastrophe, with a
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tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade” (Nietzsche 1967: 3). Tied directly to this
opening to his work is exactly the sentiment earlier stated, “For why has the advent of nihilism
become necessary? Because the values we have had hitherto thus draw their final consequence;
because nihilism represents the logical conclusion of our great values and ideals—because we
must experience nihilism before we can find out what these ‘values’ really had.—We require,
sometime, new values” (ibid. 4). As well, Nietzsche affirms my previous postulate, that nihilism
represents a phase that capitalistic countries must pass through, as a consequence, for the “highest
values devalue[ing] themselves” (ibid. 8). Of this prerequisite phase, Nietzsche writes: “[N]ihilism
represents a pathological stage . . . [where the subject finds] . . . that there is no truth, that there is
no absolute nature of things nor a ‘thing-in-itself’ . . . It places the value of things precisely in their
lack of any reality corresponding to these values” (ibid. 14). The important point to make here is
that this aptly coincides with the negative space found between commodified objects and the
thinking subject a la Adorno and Heidegger. As we will see in the next section, this negative space
represents a place of intoxication where art may flourish.
The second place where Nietzsche intimates nihilism, and where he begins to prescribe the
way in which, in our study, the objectified subject, may participate in becoming, differentiated by
notions of the last man and the Übermensch, is in his work Thus Spoke Zarathustra. As mentioned,
the time period that Nietzsche lived in, with its increased alienation, a symptom of universal
commodification, was already weakening the girders of traditional valuation. This devaluation of
valuation and metaphysical concepts stemmed from the “death of God” (Milchman and Rosenberg
47). Once we had these former metaphysical valuations, we could either accept the givenness of
the inauthentic, nihilistic objects of the commodity structure, or actively pursue our own
valuations; the former referring to the last man and reactive nihilism, and the latter referring to the
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Übermensch, or active nihilism. “The hallmark of passive [reactive] nihilism, for Nietzsche, is ‘. .
. a will to nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions
of life’” (Ibid 48), taking on the characteristics of “complacency, happiness, contentment, and
indifference”.
This almost state of the last man, almost perfectly mirrors the individual participating in
the world of the They-self through the incorporation of objects of inauthenticity, or objects devoid
of truth and freedom. In the next section, we will explore Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s notions of
art, and the way in which the negative space postulated by Adorno is the source for the intoxication
requisite for art objects. As well, we will explore the active participation required by both thinkers
to overcome the givenness of inauthentic existence.
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Part Four: Postmodernity and the Aesthetic Redemption of the Subject
In this section, we will refer back to Adorno’s negative dialectics from the first part, as a
function for ascertaining the truth and freedom in the object, requisite for authentic existence of
the subject. In Part Two and Three we tried to show that the time period of the early twentieth
century, made a turn towards universal commodification having the explicit effect of creating a
state of givenness, participation therein creating a state of nihilism and the objectification of the
subject. To qualify this statement, it may perhaps be easier to understand that this nihilism is not
as severe and overwhelming and yet still possesses an anomic and alienating quality. In fact, we
just described the state as one of “complacency, happiness, contentment, and indifference” as well,
relating the commodity structure to the falling prey of Heidegger, we get an added definition via
Heidegger of that of “tranquillization”: “This tranquillization in inauthentic being . . . [causes the
subject to drift] toward an alienation in which its own potentiality for being-in-the-world is
concealed” (Heidegger 1992: 166). In other words, an artificial happiness.
It is here important to understand how and what postmodernity is. It represents a specific
time period: “Marxists and non-Marxists alike have come around to the feeling that at some
point following World War Two, a new kind of society began to emerge (variously described as
post-industrial society, multinational capitalism, consumer society, media society and so forth).
New types of consumption; planned obsolescence; an ever more rapid rhythm of fashion and
styling changes; the penetration of advertising, television, and the media generally to a hitherto
unparalleled degree throughout society [ed. See: objects of technology]” (Jameson 1998: 19).
Further, Terry Eagleton writes that post-modernism represents a time period where exists a
“degree of skepticism about the objectivity of truth . . . [and that] springs from the historic shift
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in the West to a new form of capitalism—to the ephemeral, decentralized, world of technology,
consumerism and the culture industry” (Eagleton 1996: vii).
In the postmodern ethos, we are bereft of any former guideposts of culture or valuation,
and are left to manufacture surrogate values with little to no historical precedent. Postmodern
milieu represents the moment where the Western individual finds themselves after they have
passed through and are existing in commodity structure, falling prey state of either passive or
active nihilism. Further, it represents a point where the construction of valuation comes from the
curative of aesthetic of creating an art object, or through the process of becoming an art object.
Approaching redemption in this area requires that we find within an art object, by way of
its negative space it possesses by not being immediately encompassed, the truth or freedom that I
elucidated earlier. This redemptive nature of the art object, equitable with Adorno’s general
notion of aesthetics is one that “retrieve[s] that which had been lost by the ideological
preeminence of the subject of bourgeois philosophy in both its Enlightenment-rational and
romantic irrational forms . . . [using] ‘negative dialectics’, the subject retained contact with the
object appropriating it” (Buck-Morss 132). To put it another way, we seek an object in the art
object such that it acts in a non-conceptual semblance that would disallow it from falling victim
to the intentionality of the artist; the art object flees the conceptualization that would thereby
“devalue” (Adorno 94) it.
Here we will revisit our earlier discussion of the types of objects, specifically the art
object. My position is that the art object has certain specific criteria. 1) it may be anything
crafted by a person, with the intention of each piece being non-identical to any other of the same
kind, 2) the crafting of the piece by the subject must involve some potential for failure, 3) the
object crafted should represent a form not-to-be-overcome rationally, and should aim at being a
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“surrogate” and yet authentic form of existential crises for the artist, and preferably to the
audience; 4) the intention of the artist cannot primarily be for any material gains; 5) the artist
must have developed some mastery of their craft prior to accomplishing the work; 6) the object
crafted, itself must carry the potential to convey truth and freedom to perhaps not only the artist
who crafted it, but as well, to any other subject through its creation in a state of unintentional or
unencompassed intoxication; the greater the work of art, the more universal this quality is. This
last criteria is in direct response to Adorno’s negative dialectics, and represents the key to the
salvation of the subject living in post-modernity in truth, freedom, and authenticity. There is one
main caveat to the above definition of art: namely, that the relation between subject and object is
one of entanglement such that the entanglement itself has the inherent relation to the commodity
structure. Therefore, the art object itself is informed and takes shape via the facticity of the
present, and yet stands for the freedom of creation, and produces an authenticity that mirrors the
authentic becoming of the subject.
As I mentioned before, the moment of authenticity prerequires an inauthentic falling
prey-ness of the subject. In Heidegger, we have already described how the being-in-the-world,
for us, represents the commodity structure and gives commodities for us ready-made. We also
spelled out how this being in the commodity structure is part of our constitution, or facticity,
informing our existence; for commodities, unlike art objects, are themselves inauthentic, and our
participating in them precludes our own level and degree of inauthentic Being. Further, the
They-self, aware of this nihilistic deficiency in authenticity seeks to tempt us with commodities
wearing the “skins” of authenticity (Miklitsch 72).
We may think of an Urban Outfitter selling a new t-shirt with a traditional Navajo print,
itself a commodity with the “skin” of authenticity, where truly the “body” or essence of the garb
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reflects not the deceptive meaning, but lies ciphered in a “constellation of construction” whereby
the entire commodity culture itself may be revealed. In this way, commodity is able to brand
itself, pretending to be what it is not. And by the way of identifying with the given object of
inauthenticity prevailing in our society, then, it follows that the subject will much more readily
find truth in making one’s own art object, thereby actively participating in one’s own
authenticity. Further, “in the work, the happening of truth is at work” (Heidegger 2008: 183), and
this “unconcealment . . . [of our own being] puts us into such a condition of being that in our
representation we always remain installed within and in attendance upon unconcealment” (ibid.
177). Therefore, the process of creating art objects at once unconceals the factic reality of not
only nihilism, but also produces authentic objects that come from freedom also possess the
mystery of negative space.
If in Heidegger’s concept of the art object, we attain to descriptions of truth and
authenticity, we look now at Nietzsche and first his relation to art, and then to his notion of the
Übermensch as aesthetic prescriptions for redemption of the subject through becoming an art
object.
How we can relate Nietzsche’s notion of the aesthetic to Adorno’s dialectic involves
Nietzsche’s description of art: “For art to exist, for any sort of aesthetic activity or perception to
exist, a certain physiological precondition is indispensable: intoxication. Intoxication must first
have heightened the excitability of the entire machine: no art results before that happens”
(Rambley 219). This intoxication mirrors almost precisely what Adorno spoke of earlier of a
seeming unintentional, immanently perceived, non-conceptual participation with the object, as
such that it happens in a near lightening moment of play, that comes from the confrontation of
just such an object-not-to-be-overcome. This potential of an art object contrasts in kind from the
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sort of objectivized object, and the objectified subject, that represents the objects complete lack
of freedom, both for itself and the subject. For Nietzsche, art is epitomized in the guise of
Dionysus, and the latter the reified object, the visage of the Greek god Apollo. The former relates
to this intoxication, the latter, to the dream (Nietzsche 2012: 83).
Lastly, the prescriptive remedy for the state of postmodernity, we find in the mode of
being for the subject as a falling prey, or an “objectified”, commodified subject, the act of
freedom requires an active working or creating. What Nietzsche prescribes is an active form of
nihilism represented by the Übermensch. This “active nihilism can open up the space for the revaluation of values, for what we will designate a transfiguration, a project of self-fashioning”
(Milchman and Rosenberg 48). Nietzsche as well equates these subjects who can live in
resolved, active nihilism as “’free spirits,’ ‘a spirit that has become free, that has again taken
possession of itself,’ to affect a self-overcoming of what he designated as Christian-Platonic
man, with its basis in the ascetic ideal, and thus to overcome the metaphysical need, and to give
rise to the creation of new values” (Ibid. 49). The Übermensch thus stands as the individual,
“who can live in a world without meaning,” (Ibid) and thus, actively participates in the becoming
of themselves.
In these two ways, the construction of the art object, and the subjective becoming authentic,
we find the aesthetic redemption of the postmodern subject.
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Part Five: Conclusion
In this paper, we have tried to show that the former dialectic relationship of subject/object
that informed the positive Absolute Idealism of Hegel and the positive material dialectic of Marx
have been insufficient to adequately derive truth and freedom from the object in postmodern
times. Part and parcel to this situation has been the entanglement implicit in the falling prey-ness
of the objectified and commodified subject within the commodity structure. Further, we have
tried to show that it is Adorno’s negative dialectic that offers the subject a tool for the
decipherment of its own facticity of being-in-the-world. This world, for those in the late capital
countries of the West, has produced universal commodification by putting artificial valuation and
even devalued both the object and then the subject resulting in nihilism. This phase of nihilism
represents the horizon of postmodernity that is experienced in everyday life with the potential for
creating value through either the givenness of the commodity structure to construct ourselves
with inauthentic constellations of meaning, or through art objects, and the self-overcoming
implied through Nietzsche’s Übermensch that together, represent the potential for the
postmodern subject to access truth, freedom and authenticity; perhaps representing the last
positive freedom available to the subject.
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